

Title: Between class struggle and the "developmental state": COSATU and the Sector Job Summits, lessons in corporatism

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The progressive labour movement, centred around COSATU, has played a key role in struggles for national liberation and socialism, but finds itself on the defensive today. This paper is intended to reflect on the development of the corporatist model in South Africa, the role of COSATU in the development of progressive and worker friendly industrial strategy and the astuteness of choosing such a strategy in the post 1994 democratic dispensation. The paper will assess the influence of the federation on such strategy subsequent to its crucial role in the establishment of South Africa's democracy and its incremental role in getting the ANC, within the alliance, into power. The paper will trace the development of Corporatism in South and using the Sector Summit (SS) process as a case study, will attempt to assess whether this initiative was at all a success both in terms of the development of working class industrial strategy as well as in broader terms corporatist dialogue. Or if indeed it is possibly time for the movement to reassess its position in terms of corporatism, particularly given the current balance of power and the lessons learned from the SS process. It will then move on to assess what influence the federation has within the social dialogue process and whether it is in the federations best interest to pursue this avenue of development.

Introduction

This Conference provides a unique opportunity for labour and academics to come together and share our knowledge and understanding. My contribution to the conference is written from my perspective, as a trade unionist working as the project manager from 2001 to 2005 of the Sector Job Summit (SJS) Project in NALEDI, ostensibly COSATU's research organisation. The SJS was an ambitious project aimed at developing, through comprehensive participatory research, working class industrial strategies to negotiating in South Africa's Tripartite forum NEDLAC. It is ostensibly a political piece, which focuses on the inherent power relations at play in any corporatist process and analyses the developments from this perspective.

In addition, I have been asked to be the discussant on this panel looking at Labour, the State and Development. The other three papers present here focused primarily on the relationship and roles between these actors. From a Western perspective they provided some useful insights into issues pertaining to the Welfare State and corporatism/social dialogue as well provide possible options, to address the changes in these relationships as a result of neo-liberalism. This paper will provide a South African Perspective on Labour, the State and Development and will attempt to talk to the previous inputs from this perspective.

Let me say at the out set that I believe there are many lessons to be learned both by South Africa from other countries and by other countries from us. This being said, in relation to the welfare state, I must agree with Wahl's assertion that model of the Welfare state cannot be assessed independent of "a very specific historic context" (Wahl 2007). Today South Africa, and the labour movement in particular, finds itself in a context, which is very different to European countries almost, a century ago and interestingly less and less different to the current European situation particularly regarding the continued onslaught of neo-liberal capitalism on the working class.

I would also like to clarify, before I begin, my use of the term corporatism to include social dialogue as it is my contention that it more effectively defines the concept under discussion. The term social dialogue, implies that there is broad social participation and

not just select representation in this dialogue, it also implies equity between the role players which I do not believe to be the case.

The current context

The progressive labour movement, centred around COSATU, has played a key role in struggles for national liberation but finds itself on the defensive today. Since 1994, labour has increasingly found itself on the back foot in defence of both its socialist ideals, in the face of increasing pressure to participate in tripartied institutions and adopt more conformist positions and the increasing onslaught of membership loss as a result of massive retrenchments, restructuring and outsourcing. There are many factors impacting on COSATU's current position but none more glaring than the current governments support of a neoliberal political and economic agenda which began with governments unilateral implementation of its neoliberal policy Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). Although some would argue that the government has moved away from a strictly neoliberal approach to the economy, there is very little evidence, in terms of tangible changes to the lives of ordinary South Africans to suggest such a move. The argument as to whether the new agenda of government has indeed shifted to a more developmental approach is not however the focus of this paper.

Free South Africa faced its birth, with massive economic and social problems. It was born with a dying economy, extreme social and economic inequality amongst its population and was severely scarred by a racist legacy, which continues to plague and distort our society thirteen years on. Unlike most other African countries, who gained their independence at a time when the Welfare State had achieved both economic and political hegemony across the world and the cold war provided a political space for developing countries. South Africa gained its independence it a time when neo-liberal hegemony prevails and political alternatives are limited. In 1994 South Africa was a country, desperately in need of a political dispensation, which would not only, provide for the basic needs of its population but would manage a process of redress. A process which required, direct intervention in the economy and extensive and progressive redistributive policies.

After the struggle against Apartheid (that spanned decades) and a legacy of centuries of colonial oppression the majority of South Africans were demanding what they rightly deserved, justice, care and healing. The Labour movement had played an intrinsic role in the fight for liberation, workers had endured the most unjust and brutal labour regime, had fought and died alongside comrades from the ANC, SACP and the myriad of church and other civil society organisations who formed the United Democratic Front (UDF). and it was time to not only for political freedom but for economic justice. The mass based struggles had been premised on the principles of the Freedom charter which were underlined by a strong belief in socialism, held by the majority of the population as the only just alternative for our future.

With the ANC winning the vast majority of votes in the 1994 elections and the socialist rhetoric which underlined both the liberation struggle and the ANC's election campaign, it was not unreasonable to expect that "our" government would provide an environment that would facilitate this to happen.

There are many arguments and theories as to what went wrong, South Africa is notorious for having one of the highest gini-coefficient¹ in the world and this has increased since 1994. What could have been done better and what should be done, is a fiercely debated issue. This debate includes a very strong and popular argument for the continued support and strengthening of corporatist structures, social democracy or as Webster and Adler term it "Class Compromise" (Webster et al 1999) to undo the damage.

In order to understand the current political context it is important to provide a brief overview of the development of corporatism in South Africa.

The emergence of a corporatism in South Africa

Van der Walt argues that as early as the mid 1970's sections of capital in South Africa had "shown an interest in engaging labour in a range of issues above and beyond the routine collective bargaining" (van der Walt 1997 pp. 3). This analysis should include governments move towards reform, for example The Bantu Labour Relations

Regulations Amendment Bill (1976) and the establishment of the Wiehahn commission (1977). These reforms included the establishment of Industrial Councils in which members of Industrial Committees were permitted to attend but had no voting rights. (Ulrich 2007). The move towards corporatism was cemented in the mid 1980's, when COSATU and the National Congress of Trade Unions entered into negotiations with the South African Employers' Consultation Committee on Labour Affairs (SACOLA) to revise the Labour Relations Act (van der Walt, 1997). This relationship led in May 1990 to the "CNS accord" between COSATU, National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) and SACCOLA and was followed, in 1991, by the Labouria Minute. The Labouria Minute "was the first example of a major policy issue being addressed by means of a negotiated compromise between the state and representative organisations." (Webster et al 1999 pp.360) The Labouria minute, lead to the establishment of the New Manpower Commission (NMC) where Labour participated in negotiations around issues of Labour Regime and the National Economic Forum (NEF) where macro-economic issues were negotiated. After 1994 the "ANC-led Government of National Unity merged the NMC and NEF to form a new statutory body - the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)" (van der Waldt 1997 pp.3).

What is interesting is that there is a direct correlation between the dates when accords, compromise and contracts were entered and key moments in South African history when resistance to the Apartheid state and capitalism or serious threats to the status quo where at their strongest. The 1976 SOWETO riots and the labour uprisings which began in Durban in 1976, the uprisings of the Mid 1980's and the unbanning of the ANC and SACP in February 1990 followed by the release of Nelson Mandela and the negotiations and political turmoil that preceded the 1994 elections. This pattern of strong resistance and threat of socialist revolution, followed by capitalist concessions, corresponds well with Wahl Wahl's premise that "it was precisely the more radical currents that made capitalist forces go for class compromise in Western Europe" (Wahl 2007 pp.4). I would argue that the same applied in South Africa that the only reason why capital was prepared to compromise was because its back was against the wall.

It was within this context, of militant resistance that the white elite of South Africa negotiated a smooth transition to democracy. Panitch argues "After all, the transition

¹ Gap between the rich and the poor

from Apartheid was, in the end, a negotiated one, a compromise, and it reflected as such the continuing strength of the old ruling class and the state as well as their weaknesses" (Panitch 1996 pp.6).

After the "peaceful" transition to democracy this 'commitment' to the new South Africa would be put to the test. The establishment of NEDLAC in 1995 created a legal corporatist body in which both labour market and broader macro-economic issues must be negotiated. Certainly it gave the impression that corporatism, and in particular the participation of labour and civil society in the development of the country's policies was being taken seriously.

On the part of Labour there was a general consensus that, as part of the Alliance, labour was part the process of 'building a better life for all' (ANC 1994). And there was, in the years leading up to the 1994 elections and the first year or so after, sufficient perception of collaboration between the ANC and COSATU on policy issues to support this belief. There was also a very strong culture within the movement of negotiating in good faith built from a history of negotiations with apartheid capital. Through negotiations at NEDLAC, Labour was able to win one or two concession in the new Labour Relations Act and the Skills Development Acts negotiated through NEDLAC, however there was also a significant amount of compromise. In the Labour Relations Act for example, the right to strike was won but at the very same time the right to for employers to lock out as well as the much contested section 189, which allowed companies to retrench workers for what is termed operational requirements. Sure, this had to be negotiated with the unions in the workplace but basically this section in the law and the extensive lowering of Tariffs, became the basis for the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs through direct retrenchments or the loss of quality jobs through massive outsourcing exercises which swept across all sectors of the economy both public and private. "According to the October Household Survey, unemployment under the expanded definition (which includes those who have given up looking for work) stood at 38 per cent in 1996, compared to 32 per cent in 1994. Between March 1997 and March 1999, Statistics South Africa reported a further 6 per cent decline in employment. After 1997, the largest job losses were in gold mining, manufacturing and the public sector" (COSATU 2000)

Webster and Adler provide a comprehensive picture of the developments of corporatism leading to and after 1994 and argue that "From 1990, there were a series of economic policy reversals through which the ANC leadership came to adopt positions increasingly consistent with the neo-liberal orthodoxy" (Webster et al 1999 pp. 346). They describe how the progressive policies of the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG), a group of progressive economists initiated by the ANC's Department of Economic Policy, were never adopted and how the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), developed initially by COSATU, was amended to conform to the growing tendency towards neo-liberalism. Importantly, they argue that "The RDP, however, was central to the ANC's electoral strategy and could not simply be abandoned, above all because it was being promoted by COSATU." (Webster et al 1999 pp.364-365). Once elections were over, and the ANC won by a vast majority the party had enough confidence to challenge the progressive forces in its alliance. The first significant indication, after 1994, that power had shifted away from the progressive forces in society was in June 1996 with the ANC-led governments unilateral implementation of the neo-liberal macro-economic policy Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR).

There was a massive outcry from COSATU, the labour movement, the SACP and many other segments of Civil Society relating to both the neo-liberal agenda of the policy and the fact that it was implemented unilaterally. The policy never saw the inside of the NEDLAC negotiation chambers and interestingly this was never contested in court despite the fact that the NEDLAC act requires all Macro-economic Policy to do so. NEDLAC's lack of official objection on this point is also telling in terms of NEDLAC's ability to assert its independence in defending its legislative mandate. Indeed there was significant pressure placed on both COSATU and the SACP by the leadership of the ANC to accept the policy and neither initially demanded that the ANC drop the policy. "Thus, with painful irony, what began as an accord to bind an ANC government to a left development programme ended up ensnaring both COSATU and the SACP in a neo-liberal inspired macroeconomic policy" (Webster et al 1999 pp. 368).

In his paper Panitch (1996) discusses the remarkable concessions made in business's favour and argues that there was much more room for manoeuvre than government was willing to take. In a discussion with a business analyst he found "that business would have been prepared to pay 5% capital levy across the board as a necessary capitalist

recompense for Apartheid had the government insisted on it" (Panitch 1996 pp.3). He also argues that there was enough support for the new democracy internationally, to have allowed the government to gain exemptions from rapid neo-liberalisation of the economy. Pannitch's (1996) contention regarding these concessions is based on his assertion that the transition was a compromise, which weakened negotiating strength. Government could have for example gained concessions in terms of the WTO tariff reductions in particular or all industries. With this assertion in mind one has to ask why the new government and labour as part of the negotiation process capitulated so easily to South African capital in particular and the Neo-liberal agenda in general?

GEAR did not live up to its expectation, particularly with regard to its claims of job creation potential so in October 1998 President Nelson Mandela called the Presidential Jobs Summit. In which Government, Business, Labour and Community made a commitment to provide resources for the programmes developed by the Summit to create jobs. At the Summit, after being severely chastised by the ANC for criticising GEAR the then President of COSATU John Gomomo said "The problem we have is the notion of keeping GEAR's basic infrastructure in place. We think in the face of the acknowledgement of its failures, as well as the international crises, we need to move beyond mere adjustment to real changes that includes the structure or framework. We should all agree that as part of the post Job Summit process, we should put in place a process of engagement to deal with this matter". (COSATU, NACTU and FEDUSA 1998) The clear identification by the labour movement of the root cause of the job loss crisis, neo-liberalism, fell on deaf ears at the summit and continues to be ignored by both business and government to this day. There is a severe lack of a political critique of the status quo outside COSATU, the SACP and progressive civil society in South Africa and this can only be explained by the vested interests of business and business's continued exertion of its own interests over society as a whole.

One of the commitments made at the Jobs Summit was to set up the Sector Job Summit process in an attempt to find ways to address job losses in certain sectors and harness the job creation potential of other sectors. By 2000 very little had happened in terms of the agreements reached at the 1998 Jobs Summit and on the 10th May 2000 COSATU went on strike, in its strike memorandum had the following to say regarding job losses, unemployment and related issues: "COSATU has consistently affirmed our commitment

to negotiations on the above issues. We have at the same time emphasised that time is a key factor and we cannot afford a situation where workers continued to be retrenched while long drawn out negotiations are taking place.” (COSATU 2000). This sense of frustration with the lack of commitment on the part of business and government was to ring true through the process of the SJS and it was within this context that COATU was able to leverage financial support from government to initiate the SJS project.

The Sector Job Summits Project

The massive onslaught in terms of job loss, a million job losses since the mid 1980's (COSATU 2000) and COSATU's strong sense of responsibility towards guiding the country, through the National Democratic Revolution towards socialism motivated its participation in such programmes. COSATU based its Industrial Strategy on the following four principles:

1. The creation and protection of quality jobs
2. Help meet the needs of working class families by providing cheaper food and other basic goods as well as housing and infrastructure,
3. Develop solidarity in the sense of improving the position of women, supporting rural development and strengthening regional development,
4. Democratisise the economy and the State by empowering workers and increasing collective ownership as well as democratising government departments and strengthening labour's representation in statutory bodies and councils. (Makgetla 2001)

The Sector Job Summit produced succinct research and working class demands based on the above guiding principles but the problem lay, not with the policy but within the power relations in the corporatist negotiation process. Critics are quick to blame the Labour movements lack of capacity to engage in negotiation but at the end of an intensive participatory process we had thirty-nine (39) research papers across the nine different sectors.

COSATU, NALEDI and the following unions; Communication Workers Union (CWU), Chemical, Energy, Pulp, Paper and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU), Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), National Union

of Metal Workers (NUMSA) and the South African South Africa Catering and Commercial Allied Workers union (SACCAWU), had been given sufficient funding from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to:

- employ and train one researcher per union to conduct sector research, both primary participatory and secondary research and also to hire experts
- set up and run reference groups which consisted of Union, COSATU and NALEDI representatives to guide the process.
- run extensive workshops in order to ensure that the research was participatory,
- produce popular booklets
- run broader consultation conferences to present the research for additions, comments, omissions and to develop union positions, demands and mandates on Industrial strategy.

The National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) and the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) had held summits in the Mining and Clothing sectors respectively prior to this. These projects had been initiated by the affiliates and business and had some success in getting certain issues on the agenda. SACTWU for example managed to profile the massive job loss in the clothing sector due to Tariff reductions. For the purpose of this paper however I will focus on the SJS project.

In the case of NUMSA in the Metals and Engineering sector the union also established Industrial Strategy Teams in every province to support the process. Once the research had been conducted a conference was held to develop demands. These demands would then be taken to NEDLAC for negotiation. The following nine Industrial sectors were identified either because of their potential for job creation or because that had experience sever job losses were targeted:

Sectors that had experienced significant job loss	<i>Metals and Engineering, Pharmaceuticals, Food, Construction</i>
Sectors that had the potential to created jobs	<i>Hospitality and Tourism, Retail</i>
Sectors that had experienced job loss but potential to created jobs along the	<i>Chemical, Pulp and Paper, Automobile, Information Communication and</i>

An enormous amount of time and resources was put into the process however, after three years there was very little show for this.

To find the problem with the negotiation process at NEDLAC one would do better to look at business and government. There are in some of the sectors like the Automobile, Metals and Engineering and Chemical sectors organised business, some of whom were more open to the process than others and indeed in these sectors the process got a little further than in the others. In that we managed to get business and government around the table at NEDLAC and get some agreements in place, even if these agreements were primarily to conduct further research on areas raised by labour or where business and government had not been able to produce their own research.

Issues raised by our research were selectively championed by business and indeed when it was in the interest of business there was a lot of support for our demands. One example is that of Import Parity Pricing (IPP) on Steel by the previously, now partially, Government owned ISCOR (one of the first parastatals to be privatised by the Apartheid state in 1989). The issue was raised in the COSATU/NUMSA/NALEDI research in 2001/2 NEDLAC Metals and Engineering pre-summit talks and received extensive press coverage and support from down stream metal and engineering sub-sectors. During the negotiation process at NEDLAC, Government's Industrial Development Corporation sold all but 10% of their remaining shares in the company to Mittal Steel in 2004. This meant that it would be even more difficult to push the dropping of IPP as ISCOR had not been participating in the process and the only real pressure point, government's stake in the company was being substantially weakened. Indeed there has been little movement on the issue since then. In a Business Day article in 2005, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Mandisi Mphahle indicated that "the elimination of the system (Import Parity Pricing) was one government intervention to stimulate growth in the kinds of manufacturing industries that would create jobs". The issue of IPP is raised again in Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative South Africa (ASGISA) in 2006 but there is little movement on this commitment, in particular regarding the implementation of such preventative measures.

This example points to the problem that arises when there are attempts at corporatism within the neo-liberal paradigm. ISCOR had in the past provided a strong industrial upstream complex to support Apartheid manufacturers, this developmental role in the economy was severely undermined with the liberalisation and privatisation of the company. Industrial strategy is essentially a national developmental endeavour and the sale of government resources to Multinational corporations who have no loyalties to the country or its National Democratic agenda undermine this process substantially. It begs the question as to whether it is at all possible to plan any real industrial development strategies within the neoliberal context.

In the Communication sector, previously state owned, primarily because of governments intention to liberalise the sector, government pushed the process hard and a Summit was actually held in 2002 but very little concrete policy came out of the negotiations. The main gist of the agreement was to agree to talks about talks, further research and some principles COSATU won in terms of universal service and access and a social accord have failed. Importantly, the change in the name of the process happened during negotiations leading up to the ICT Summit and was a foreboding as to what direction this engagement would take. The dropping of the word Job from the initiative was indicative of how the concerns and demands COSATU had with regard to Industrial strategy were to be sidelined and sublimated in what turned out to be a 5 year long bout of shadow boxing with COSATU in the boxing ring (NEDLAC) and government and business standing at the ringside watching labour go through the motions by itself.

One of the agreements reached at the ICT Summit was a Social Plan which included the development of a data base of retrenched workers similar to the flexicurity measures discussed by Andranik in his paper of "firm-firm job pools" and "work-work transitions". His paper raises additional questions as to the agreements reached during corporatist negotiations around issues like social accords (Tangian 2007). As he points out, within the flexicurity, model, without social compensation this strategy [firm-firm job pools] becomes a way "to 'softly' dismiss workers" (Tangian 2007 pp. 6) Other agreements similar to flexicurity in Europe include agreements on re-skilling and life long learning. This argument, that such agreements can amount to a zero sum game, at best, if they are not carefully measured and weighed up is critical to any understanding of agreements reached in corporatist structures. Tangian raises the issue of the social

fairness of such initiatives; "Every step towards a higher labour flexibility meets interests of employers. Business gets rid of restrictions, managers improve performance by rotating and squeezing personnel, and firms gain higher profits. All expenses are recovered by the state — costly reforms and additional social security benefits. Therefore, such a flexibilization scenario turns out to be a long-running indirect governmental donation to firms. Since the state budget originates from taxpayers, the employees are the ones contributing to the donation." (Tangian 2007 pp. 13) From his analysis and Wahl's assertions that, "liberalisation without negative effects on workers does not exist" (Wahl 2007 pp.8) a clear argument, is emerging from this session and that is that within the current context the odds are against labour at the outset.

In other sectors, like the Retail, Hospitality and Tourism and Food sectors because of the non-existence of business organisation or the disparate mini sub-sector organisations dominated by small cliques of white capitalists (particularly in the food sector), it was impossible to get the programme off the ground, business was not prepared to come to the table. Government was either unable or simply unwilling to intervene or attempt to lead the process in these sectors.

Overall, results were mixed as indicated above there were some developments in more organised sectors and a few limited concessions were gained on the part of labour. However, support for the Sector Summit process was one sided on the part of labour, very little press coverage or documentation on the part of business or government can be found on the sector Summit process or on the issues, suggestions and commitments made. By the end of 2002 it was clear there had been no major achievements or gains through the process.

It was becoming clear that something needed to be done if even the veneer of social dialogue was to be maintained. The Minister of labour Membathisi Mdladlana in the forward to the NEDLAC Growth and Development Summit Agreement had the following to say " Our task was made daunting by the experience of the previous Jobs Summit, where all stakeholders did not pursue agreements reached. We had to ensure, this time around, to come up with concrete actions to address the development challenges facing our country. We dare not fail" (NEDLAC 2003 pp. iii). And yet we continue to fail, four years on very little progress has been made on the agreements reached by the Growth

and development Summit. Yes, COSATU through its Labour Job Creation Trust which was created from workers contributed of a days created 4661 temporary and permanent jobs (NEDLAC 2004). Government has begun to spend money and create temporary jobs in its public works programme and there has been some movement in terms of pushing learnerships for young entrants in the labour market. However in terms of the larger initiatives agreed to at the summit for example the agreement to ensure that a percentage of investment goes towards development, there is still disagreement on a definition of deserving investments in order to decide where to invest the agreed 5% of investible funds to support development.

Two questions arise from this brief overview of the corporatist attempt to develop industrial strategy. Firstly, how in a country with 25.6% unemployment (Labour Force Survey March 2006) according to the official definition and around to 42% according to the expanded definition, with an ever increasing gini-coefficient (despite substantial growth in the GDP), with and severely compromised education system in tatters, and equally ineffectual health system etc., how can the agreements and the continued lack of implementation I have just outlined ever meet the need of the population of South Africa? The answer is that these agreements can not and will not ever be enough. Desai and Habib argue in their paper Labour Relations in Transition: The Rise of Corporatism in South Africa's Automobile Industry that the " Political elites, recognising that their programme of reforms was bound to provoke discontent, attempted to neutralise opposition by invoking the talisman of 'national interest', and by co-opting organised workers and employers through corporatist arrangements and institutions". Although a broad generalisation, there is definitely an element of truth to this statement especially given the lack of political will on the part of government to implement specifically a macro-economic policy which will support their election campaigns "a better life for all".

COSATU has again re-stated in its 2015 Plan its commitment to participate in corporatist engagements: "Ensuring quality jobs requires both stronger efforts to manage workplace and sectoral restructuring, and more targeted policy engagement overall. We cannot afford to let South Africa follow the pattern of National Democratic Revolution in the rest of Africa, where the ruling elite colludes with local and foreign capital to enrich itself at the cost of the country as a whole" (COSATU 2006). Argument around abstention or participation in corporatist structures and decision making are best left for COSATU

itself. However, I do think that the movement needs to take a much less idealistic approach to such engagements. It also needs to acknowledge that losses in such arena have less to do with capacity to engage and much more to do with the balance of power.

Lessons provided by Tangian and Wahl from Europe indicate the problems regarding the power dynamics between the state, capital and labour, stressing the point that social gains for the working class are never won through social dialogue but through direct socialist struggle. They also illustrate the inherent problems with agreements reached when bargaining from a position of disadvantage which is where labour finds itself at the moment within the neoliberal context. Agreements as attempts to ameliorate the impact of neoliberal economic policies on workers more often than not lead to a slippery slope of eroding benefits. Although South Africa is very different in many respects and this needs to be taken into account when making comparison, there are sufficient similarities to allow for broad observations on these issues.

It with this understanding that I would like to leave you with the words of Peter Kropotkin where with reference to corporatism/social democracy he said that corporatism/social democracy is "an attempt to make the masses participate in decisions concerning their own exploitation" (Kropotkin 1990 pp. 13).

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